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We study fiscal consolidations in the Central and Eastern European countries and 
what determines the probability of their success. We define consolidation events as 
substantive improvements in fiscal balances adjusting for the impact of cyclical 
effects. We use Logit models for the period 1991–2003 to assess the determinants of 
the success of a fiscal adjustment. The results seem to suggest that for these countries 
expenditure based consolidations have tended to be more successful. By contrast, 
revenue based consolidations have a tendency to be less successful. 
 
 
JEL Classification Numbers: C25, E62, H62. 
 





































Many of the Central and Eastern European countries will have to undertake fiscal 
consolidation in the near future to reverse the trend of rising debt ratios and comply 
with the European Union fiscal framework. Indeed, several countries exhibit sizeable 
fiscal deficits, some by far exceeding the 3% of GDP reference value set by the 
Maastricht Treaty. Moreover, while public debt ratios are generally below those of the 
existing EU countries, debt has increased rapidly in many countries and policy 
discussions are starting to focus on the need to reverse those trends. Additionally, the 
existence in these countries of large but not yet very well appraised implicit liabilities 
could also be a matter of concern. 
 
The theoretical and empirical literature shows that basing fiscal consolidation on 
expenditure reduction can have beneficial macroeconomic effects and raise the 
probability of success.  A channel for differential effects of alternative ways of fiscal 
consolidation arises when models take the credibility of fiscal consolidation into 
account. If governments succeed in convincing markets that specific consolidation 
measures will improve fiscal sustainability, interest rate risk premia should fall and 
agents’ discounted lifetime income rise, leading to higher aggregate demand. With 
high tax burdens, revenue based consolidations may lack credibility, as agents may 
correctly anticipate that additional tax increases will have to be reversed, e.g. due to 
their adverse impact on economic incentives. By contrast, expenditure reductions, in 
particular in politically sensitive areas such as household transfers, may convince 
agents that the consolidation effort is serious and will produce a lasting improvement 
 European countries has so far been lacking. 
 
In this paper we evaluate if and to what extent expenditure based consolidations have 
been more successful than other consolidations in Central and Eastern European 
countries. Our sample consists of eight new EU Member States from Central and 
Eastern Europe plus the candidate countries Bulgaria and Romania for the period 
1991–2003. In addition, we take into account the EU15 countries for the same period. 
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in fiscal sustainability. Therefore, the question of how to design fiscal consolidations 
is of imminent interest. However, conclusive evidence for the Central and Eastern
 
This allows us to check if the success of fiscal consolidations is explained in a similar 
way both for the EU15 countries and for the Central and Eastern European countries. 
The paper adds to a small but growing literature on fiscal policies in Central and 
Eastern Europe by applying to those countries concepts that have been found useful in 
explaining fiscal policy events in established market economies. 
 
Our empirical results show that since the early 1990’s expenditure based 
consolidations have indeed tended to be more successful in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The reverse is also true, namely that revenue based consolidations have 
tended to reduce the likelihood of success. The results are robust to alternative 
thresholds for the identification of fiscal events and budget composition. Using 
primary balances we find some support for a significant role of the expenditure 
composition when estimating the effect for the EU15 and the Central and Eastern 
European countries combined. 
 
The results differ from those for the EU15 countries, where both composition 
dummies remain generally insignificant. The dominance of expenditure based 
consolidations in Central and Eastern Europe might be explained by an inability to 
increase revenue ratios above already high levels due to a lack of administrative 





















Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that expenditure based fiscal 
consolidations rather than revenue based can have more beneficial macroeconomic 
effects. Moreover, expenditure based fiscal consolidations tend to improve the budget 
balance more persistently and thus are often seen as being more successful. Available 
empirical evaluations of fiscal consolidations so far have concentrated on OECD and 
EU15 countries and evidence for the Central and Eastern Europe is lacking.  
 
Against this background this paper aims to evaluate if and to what extent expenditure 
based consolidations have been more successful than other consolidations in Central 
and Eastern European countries. Our sample consists of eight new EU Member States 
from Central and Eastern Europe plus the candidate countries Bulgaria and Romania 
(CE10) for the period 1991–2003. In addition, we take into account the EU15 
countries for the same period. This allows us to check if the success of fiscal 
consolidations is explained in a similar way both for the EU15 countries and for the 
Central and Eastern European countries.  
 
The paper adds to a small but growing literature on fiscal policies in Central and 
Eastern Europe by applying to those countries concepts that have been found useful in 
explaining fiscal policy events in established market economies. 
 
Based on the estimation of Logit specifications, we find that the higher the share of 
expenditure reduction relative to the change (improvement) in the budget balance, the 
higher is the probability of a fiscal consolidation being successful. However, these 
results differ somewhat across country groups. By contrast, revenue based 
consolidations seem to have a tendency to be less successful. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section two discusses the motivation and briefly 
reviews the related literature. Section three explains our approach to assess fiscal 
adjustments. Section four sets up the empirical analysis framework and reports the 
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2. Motivation and related literature  
 
Fiscal consolidation is required in most Central and Eastern European countries in our 
sample. Several countries exhibit sizeable fiscal deficits, some by far exceeding the 
3% of GDP reference value set by the Maastricht Treaty (see Table 1). Moreover, 
while public debt ratios are generally below those of the existing EU countries, debt 
has increased rapidly in many countries and policy discussions are starting to focus on 
the need to reverse those trends. Additionally, the existence of large but not yet very 
well assessed implicit liabilities could also be a matter of concern in these countries. 
Finally, as revenue ratios in many of the countries are already high compared to 
countries with similar levels of development, the need for expenditure reduction 
becomes increasingly pressing.1 
 
Table 1 – Projected budget balance and debt ratios,  











BE -0.1 95.8 BU 0.5 38.1 
DK 1.0 43.4 CZ -4.8 37.8 
DE -3.9 65.9 EE 0.5 4.8 
EL -5.5 112.2 LV -2.0 14.6 
ES -0.6 48.2 LT -2.6 21.1 
FR -3.7 64.9 HU -5.5 59.7 
IE -0.2 30.7 PL -5.6 47.7 
IT -3.0 106.0 RO -1.6 21.8 
LU -0.8 4.9 SI -2.3 30.9 
NL -2.9 55.7 SK -3.9 44.2 
AT -1.3 64.0    
PT -2.9 60.8    
FI -2.3 44.8    
SE 0.6 51.6    
UK -2.8 40.4    
 






                                                          
1 Analysis of public finances in the EU new Member States are provided, for instance, by Sousa 
and Borbély (2003) and by Backé et al. (2004). 
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2.1. Different macroeconomic effects of consolidations 
 
From a theoretical point of view, while in the standard Keynesian set-up with non-
distortionary lump sum taxes only changes in the deficit matter for the 
macroeconomic outcome, the way in which such changes are achieved makes a 
difference if taxation induces deadweight losses. In fact, in this case the effects of 
fiscal policy on aggregate consumption can be non-linear because the deadweight loss 
of taxation rises rapidly with the extent of taxation.  
 
An additional channel for differential effects of alternative ways of fiscal 
consolidation arises when models take the credibility of fiscal consolidation into 
account. If governments succeed in convincing markets that specific consolidation 
measures will improve fiscal sustainability, interest rate risk premia should fall and 
agents’ discounted lifetime income rise, leading to higher aggregate demand. With 
high tax burdens, revenue based consolidations may lack credibility, as agents may 
correctly anticipate that additional tax increases will have to be reversed, e.g. due to 
their adverse impact on economic incentives. By contrast, expenditure reductions, in 
particular in politically sensitive areas such as household transfers, may convince 
agents that the consolidation effort is serious and will produce a lasting improvement 
in fiscal sustainability. 
 
Finally, the design of fiscal consolidation can affect the macroeconomic outcome also 
via wages and investment. In particular, if expenditure cuts in the area of public 
employment lead to a reduction of overall wage pressure in the economy, this may 
induce firms to hire more workers and raise investment spending, thus driving up 
growth. 
 
2.2. Literature review on the effects and success of consolidation efforts 
 
After the initial contribution by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), several studies have 
found empirical evidence supporting the importance of the composition of the fiscal 
adjustment for the macroeconomic outcomes, in particular those addressing the issue 
9
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of potential non-Keynesian effects of fiscal consolidations.2 The probability of 
expansionary effects of fiscal consolidations was found to be higher for expenditure 
based than for revenue based consolidations. This holds in particular, if the 
expenditure reduction focused on public wage expenditure and government transfers. 
 
To analyse differential composition effects in greater detail, Alesina and Perotti 
(1997) define two types of fiscal adjustment: Type 1 adjustments – when the budget 
deficit is reduced through cuts in social expenditures (unemployment subsidies, 
minimum income subsidies) and cuts in the public sector wages. Type 2 adjustments – 
when the budget deficit is reduced through the increase of taxes on labour income and 
through cuts in public investment expenditures. Accordingly the authors maintain 
that, for instance, the well-known fiscal episode of Ireland in 1987–1989 was a Type 
1 adjustment. On the other hand, the fiscal episode of 1983–1986 in Denmark could 
be classified as a Type 2 adjustment. In general, Type 1 adjustments are expected to 
have more beneficial effects on economic growth as they raise labour incentives and 
reduce expected future tax burdens. 
 
Additional evidence on the different effects of alternative consolidation approaches 
can be derived from VAR studies. Including revenue and expenditure variables in a 
VAR together with macroeconomic variables allows checking directly for possible 
differential effects of shocks to those fiscal variables. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 
support the intuition that discretionary changes in taxes and expenditures have 
different effects on the macroeconomic variables, by finding generally stronger short 
run effects of expenditure measures. De Arcangelis and Lamartina (2003) go a step 
further and check for different effects of individual revenue and expenditure 
components and find differential effects of these components, while the overall 
impact is generally relatively small. 
 
The composition of the adjustment has been used extensively to analyse which factors 
determine the success of fiscal consolidations. However, there is no consensus in the 
literature on how to determine if a fiscal consolidation is successful. Differences relate 
to the variables used, as well as to the number of periods used to “measure” successes. 
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Commonly used explanatory variables include the size of the adjustment, its duration 
and also initial conditions such as the initial debt-to-GDP ratio or GDP real growth 
just before the adjustment. 
 
To evaluate the success of fiscal consolidations, some authors estimate Logit and 
Probit specifications. For instance, McDermott and Westcott (1996) estimate Logit 
models for the OECD countries. The dependent variable assumes the value one if the 
episode is successful and the value zero if the episode is not successful. Additionally a 
dummy explanatory variable takes the value one if at least 60 per cent of the fiscal 
adjustment results from a decrease of public spending and takes the value zero 
otherwise. There is by now a wide range of comparable studies. Alesina and Perotti 
(1995, 1997), Giavazzi and Pagano (1990, 1996), McDermott and Wescott (1996), 
Alesina and Ardagna (1998), Perotti (1998) and Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (2000), 
and EC (2003) present empirical results concerning the composition and size 
determinants of successful adjustments. On the other hand, Heylen and Everaert 
(2000) empirically contest the idea that current expenditure reductions are the best 
policy to get a successful fiscal consolidation. Von Hagen, Hughes-Hallet and Strauch 
(2001) and EC (2003) also provide additional descriptive analysis and case studies.  
 
Table 2 summarises the main empirical literature using Logit and Probit analyses to 
assess the success of fiscal consolidations. 
 
















Logit  A reduction in public 
spending is more likely to 












Fiscal retrenchment is more 
likely to be expansionist. 







Fiscal contractions are more 
successful when there are 








Logit A reduction in public 
spending is more successful 









The abovementioned literature uses several definitions for identifying fiscal 
consolidations, relying essentially on the structural budget balance concept, the 
balance that would arise if both expenditures and taxes were determined by potential 
rather than actual output. However, the structural budget does not allow the correction 
of all the effects on budget balance resulting from changes in economic activity such 
as inflation or real interest rate changes. 
  
The usually adopted measure is the primary structural budget balance, i.e. the total 
balance excluding interest expenditure. This measure is used either as percentage of 
GDP or as a percentage of potential output. However, using the total budget balance 
instead of the primary budget balance may have advantages, e.g. if the consolidation 
leads to a lower interest rate and thus further consolidation benefits. In practice, and in 
the surveyed studies, the differences between using the total budget deficit or the 
primary budget deficit to determine the fiscal episodes are not very significant. 
 
Besides the choice of the budget measure, there are also differences in the literature as 
to how to define the period of a fiscal contraction or expansion. According to the 
chosen definition, the number of fiscal episodes changes as well as the turning points 
of fiscal policy (“trigger points” in Bertola and Drazen (1993) terminology).  
 
For instance, Alesina and Perotti (1995) use two alternative definitions for fiscal 
episodes: in the first one, they take into account the years where the change of the 
primary structural balance exceeds 1.5 percent of GDP. In the second one, they 
consider the years where the change of the primary structural balance deviates from 
the country average change by plus or minus one standard deviation. 
 
The definition used by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) decreases the probability of fiscal 
adjustment periods with only one year by using a limit of 3 percentage points of GDP 
for a single year consolidation. They determine a fiscal adjustment by checking 
whether the accumulated change in the primary structural deficit is above 5, 4 and 3 
percentage points of GDP respectively in four, three and two consecutive years or the 
change is of 3 percentage points of potential GDP in one single year. Alternatively, 
Alesina and Ardagna (1998) adopted the following fiscal episode definition: the 
primary structural balance increases at least 2 percentage points of GDP, in one year, 
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or, increases 1.5 percentage points of GDP on average in two consecutive years. This 
allows for instance that some stabilisation periods may have only one year.   
 
3. Assessing fiscal adjustments 
3.1. Determining fiscal episodes 
 
We are interested in the evolution of the budget balance as a ratio of GDP, and also in 
the fraction of that change that may be attributed to discretionary measures taken by 
the fiscal authorities. In other words, we need to decompose the change of the budget 
balance-to-GDP ratio into its components. In order to do that, one has to compute the 
total derivative of the budget balance ratio. 
 
Denoting the budget balance as B, which is equal to government revenues, T, minus 
government expenditures, G, and being GDP given by Y, the total derivative of B/Y is 
written as follows: 
 
 















































= − , (3) 
 
or, for small changes in the variables,  
 












= − . (4) 
 






GTb ∆−∆−∆=∆ . (5) 
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Following for instance von Hagen et al. (2001) we can define a neutral fiscal policy 
stance as resulting in identical changes in both government expenditures and 




Ybb y ∆−=∆ , (6) 
 
where ∆by is then the contribution of economic growth to the change in the budget 
balance.3 This growth effect should now be deducted from the actual change in the 
budget balance in order to proxy the discretionary change in the budget balance ∆b*: 
 
 ybbb ∆−∆=∆ * . (7) 
 
We can now proceed with the explanation of the criteria that we used to determine the 
so-called fiscal consolidation events and the success of those events. 
 








][ if ,1 * γσµt
t
bE , (8) 
 
where ∆b* was defined previously in (7), and µ and σ are respectively the average and 
the standard deviation for all discretionary changes in the budget balance in the entire 
sample, while γ is applied to determine a multiple of the standard deviation as 
commonly used in the literature.4 
 
A fiscal adjustment is defined as successful if the general government balance 
improves by α-times the standard deviation of all discretionary changes in the balance 
                                                          
3 Alternatively, one can notice that a more demanding definition, without assuming that ∆T=∆G, 





−=∆ )( , where t=∆T/T and supposing also that ∆G=0. 
4 As in all the related literature, here there is also an element of arbitrariness. 
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SU , (9) 
 
and we use, for simplicity, α=1 in (9). 
 
In order to control for the composition of the adjustment, i. e. whether or not the 
change in expenditure is significant vis-à-vis the change in the budget balance, we 
construct the dummy variable EXP, to be used as an explanatory variable in the 
subsequent Logit analysis. For the cases where a successful consolidation can be 








)/exp( if ,1 * λtt
t
b
EXP , (10) 
 
where exp is the value for total expenditure in year t. 
 
3.2. Descriptive data for fiscal episodes 
 
As data sources the AMECO database of the EC is used for the EU15 countries, while 
for the CE10 countries the WEO database is used.5 To have a view of how the 
changes in discretionary fiscal balances are spread across countries and years, Figure 
1 depicts the results of calculations for equation (7), using the total balance and λ=2/3 
                                                          
5 The relevant codes used for the data are as follows: 
   Ameco   WEO 
- total budget deficit 1.0.319.0.UBLGE GGB    
- primary budget deficit 1.0.319.0.UBLGIE GGBXI 
- total expenditure 1.0.319.0.UUTGE GGENL 
- total revenue  1.0.319.0.URTG  GGRG  
- interest expenditure 1.0.319.0.UYIGE GGEI  
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as our benchmark.6 As can be seen, the distribution is centred around zero and has a 
higher kurtosis than the normal distribution.  
 
Figure 1 – Changes in total “discretionary” balance, 





Moreover, Table 3 presents all the individual events identified for each country. 
Almost all CE10 countries implemented fiscal consolidations according to our 
definition during the first half of the nineties with 1993 being the year with the largest 
number of consolidations. This might reflect that governments at that time used a 
window of opportunity for fiscal consolidation as economic output bottomed out after 
the drop in the early transition period and the growth outlook improved. Another 
spike in the number of countries is 1997 with four observations after which the 
number of events declines and remains equal or below two for the remainder of the 
observation period. The only year where no fiscal consolidation is recorded in any of 
the CE10 countries is 2002.7 
 
By contrast, fiscal consolidations in the EU15 are concentrated in the years 1995 
through 1997 with more than half of all observations occurring in this period. Another 
                                                          
6 For instance, McDermott and Westcott (1996) use a 60 per cent threshold. In section 4.2 we 
perform some sensitivity analysis to check the impact of changing our chosen threshold from 2/3 
to 1/2 and to 3/4. 
7 One has to mention that in order to determine whether a success occurs in 2003, forecasts for 
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local maximum occurs in the year 2000 after which fiscal consolidation events are 
rare and unsuccessful (cfr. lower panel of Table 3).8  
 
Table 3 – Fiscal adjustment events and successes (using a 2/3 threshold), 
CE10, and EU15, 1991-2003 
 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
                         e s 
Bulgaria e s   e s     e s e            4 3 
Czech Republic   e                      1 0 
Estonia     e      e      e s       3 1 
Hungary       e s e              e s 3 2 
Latvia   e      e s e              3 1 
Lithuania           e      e s       2 1 
Poland   e s                     1 1 
Romania   e s           e          2 1 
Slovak 
Republic   
e s e s 
            e s   e s 4 4 
Slovenia                         0 0 
Events 1  5  3  1  2  4  1  1  2  1  0  2  23  
Successes  1  3  2  1  1  1  0  0  2  1  0  2  14 
                           
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
                         e s 
Austria           e        e      2 0 
Belgium     e s     e s             2 2 
Denmark               e          1 0 
Finland       e s   e s e s   e s       4 4 
France                         0 0 
Germany                         0 0 
Greece     e s   e s e s             3 3 
Ireland         e s       e        2 1 
Italy           e s             1 1 
Luxembourg                 e s       1 1 
Netherlands         e s               1 1 
Portugal e                    e    2 0 
Spain         e s e    e          3 1 




        e s e s           2 2 
Events 1  0  2  2  5  7  3  2  4  1  1  0  28  
Successes  0  0  2  2  5  5  3  0  3  0  0  0  20 
 




                                                          
8 The differences in the occurrence of fiscal consolidations might also be explained by the 
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The number of events, successes and the occurrences of the expenditure dummy 
composition are reported in Table 4 (also for alternative expenditure thresholds).9 
With a less (more) demanding limit, one naturally gets more (less) fiscal events. For 
instance, with a less demanding limit one also gets a few more successes and a 
decrease in the success rate. 
 
Table 4 – Events, successes and expenditure composition for the total balance 
CE10 and EU15, 1991-2003 
 
expenditure dummy threshold: λ=2/3  
Events Success Success rate * Expenditure 
Dummy 
CE10 23 14 61% 12 
EU15 28 20 71% 15 
CE10; EU15 51 34 67% 27 
expenditure dummy threshold: λ=1/2  
Events Success Success rate * Expenditure 
Dummy 
CE10 25 14 56% 13 
EU15 44 28 64% 31 
CE10; EU15 69 42 61% 44 
expenditure dummy threshold: λ=3/4  
Events Success Success rate * Expenditure 
Dummy 
CE10 23 14 61% 11 
EU15 24 18 75% 11 
CE10; EU15 47 32 68% 22 
 
Notes: The expenditure dummy means that there was a decrease in expenditures of at least λ 
of the improvement in the budget balance, see (10). * - Successes/ Events. 
 
3.3. Comparison of expenditure based adjustments 
 
Table 5 presents some characteristics of different consolidations. There seems to be 
some evidence that in Central and Eastern Europe expenditure based consolidations 
tend to be somewhat larger than the average size of all consolidations. Similarly, it 
would seem that Central and Eastern Europe expenditure based consolidations start 
out from a higher overall deficit situation in the preceding year. With regard to the 
growth rate in the period prior to the consolidation event, by contrast, there seems to 
be no major difference.  
                                                          
9 Tondl (2004) also computes fiscal episodes for Eastern European countries, using an approach 








Table 5 – Size of consolidations, total deficit 
EU15 and CE10, 1991-2003  
 
 
Size of consolidation 
(in % of GDP) 
Average fiscal balance 
prior to consolidation 
(in % of GDP) 
Average growth prior to 

















Total deficit       
CE10 3.8 4.2 -6.4 -7.8 -1.6 -1.6 
EU15 2.5 2.0 -3.9 -3.1 3.5 4.2 
 
For the EU15 countries, the evidence is somewhat different since expenditure based 
consolidations tend to be somewhat smaller than average (although the difference is 
negligible when looking at primary deficits). Also in contrast to Central and Eastern 
Europe, expenditure based consolidations tend to start out from lower deficits and 
higher growth rates in the preceding period.  
 
Overall, this evidence would support the notion that expenditure based consolidations 
are perceived differently by policy makers in Central and Eastern Europe and in the 
EU15. In Central and Eastern Europe expenditure based consolidations may be seen 
as a more drastic tool for consolidation in times of greater fiscal distress. Conversely, 
in the EU15, expenditure reduction might be perceived as more of a fiscal “luxury” 
that can be implemented in times of stronger growth and less pressing consolidation 
requirements. One possible explanation for the different perceptions could lie in 
different administrative capacity between the two country groups. While generally 
well developed tax administrations in the EU15 allowed those countries to implement 
revenue increases in times of consolidation, a lack of such capacity may have driven 
the Central Eastern European countries to resort to expenditure reductions during the 
observation period. The importance of administrative capacity for the development of 
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4. Analytical framework 
4.1. Estimation results and discussion 
 
In this section we assess whether the relative share of expenditure changes in the 
consolidation affects the success of fiscal consolidations. To answer those questions a 












|1 , (11) 
 
where E[S=1|Zi] is the conditional expectation of the success of a fiscal 







;       ,0
,      ,1
successfulnotisionconsolidattheif
successfulisionconsolidattheif
S , (12) 
 
One can interpret (11) as the conditional probability that a successful consolidation 
occurs given Zi, and 
 
 iii EXPBZ δβα ++= , (13) 
 
where B is the “discretionary change” in the primary budget balance (computed via 
(7)). The dummy variable EXP was defined in (10), and assumes the value one when 
the change in the primary expenditure is at least two thirds of the change in the 
primary budget balance, and zero otherwise. 
 
In order to assess whether there is a different behaviour between the EU15 countries 
and the CE10 countries, the following modified version of (13) was also estimated: 
 
 )()()( 212121 iiiiiiii EXPDEXPBDBDZ δδββαα +++++= ,  (14) 
 
where D is a dummy variable that takes the value one if a country belongs to the 
EU15 group and the value zero if the country belongs to the CE10 country group. On 
20
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the other hand, α2 is the difference to the intercept and β2 and δ2 are the slope 
differences of one group of countries vis-à-vis the other group. 
 
The results for the estimation of equations (13) and (14) are reported in Table 6, using 
the total budget balance.  
 
Table 6 – Estimation results (using a 2/3 threshold) for total balances,  
EU15 and CE10, 1991-2003  
 
EU15, CE10  
No group  
dummy, eq. (13) 
With group 































































McFadden R2  0,29 
 
0,30 0,14 0,48 
Nº of observations 
 
51 51 28 23 










Notes: The t statistics are in brackets. *, **, *** - Significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level 
respectively. The effect in the probability of success from a change in a continuous variable Z, is 
approximated by )]1([/ ii PPdZdP −≅ β .  
 
Table 6 (first column) shows that the size of the discretionary change in total balance 
is statistically significant to explain the success of a fiscal consolidation, and this has 
the expected sign. This means, the larger the size of the initial fiscal adjustment, the 
higher is the probability that the improvement will last over two periods. However, 








For the CE10 sub-set of countries, only the dummy variable, EXP, that reflects the 
size of change in expenditures relative to the change in the total budget balance, is 
significant. In other words, for the CE countries the composition of the adjustment 
seems relevant – expenditure-based adjustments have a higher probability to 
succeed.10 
 
The advantage of the dummy variable approach (i. e. estimating the pooled equation 
(14)) is that one gets more insights than by just doing a simple Chow test (i. e. 
estimating equation (13) for the three sub-samples). Indeed, from Table 6, the fact that 
the differential intercept coefficient α2 is statistically significant, allows accepting that 
the separate regressions for the EU15 and CE10 countries have a different intercept. 
Moreover, one can also see that the differential slope for the expenditure dummy is 
statistically different between the two groups of countries. 
 
Given that the results using the expenditure dummy are not entirely unambiguous the 
results from the opposite approach may be instructive. In particular, instead of 
including an expenditure dummy in the regression we include a revenue dummy, 








)/( if ,1 * λtt
t
brev
REV . (15) 
 
In line with our expectations, Table 7 (also with λ=2/3 in (15)) reveals that the 
presence of the revenue dummy in the estimation has a significantly negative impact 
on the likelihood of a successful consolidation. The details of the table reveal that this 
effect is driven by the behaviour of the CE10, whereas the dummy remains 
insignificant for the EU15. This result supports the notion discussed above, that tax 
increases in the CE10 are less likely to contribute to sustainable fiscal consolidation. 
                                                          
10 On the other hand, if one considers the primary balance (cfr. Appendix A), only the coefficient 
of the variable that models the “discretionary” change in the primary budget balance is statistically 
different from zero. This is true both for the EU15 countries and for the CE10 countries. Indeed, a 
discretionary improvement in the primary budget balance of one percentage point of GDP is 
related to an increase in the probability of success of the fiscal consolidation of 17 and 24 per cent 
respectively for the CE10 and for the EU15 countries. 
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Table 7 – Estimation results (using a 2/3 threshold) for total balances and with revenue 
dummy, EU15 and CE10, 1991-2003 
 
EU15, CE10  
































































0.23 0.11 0.34 
Nº of observations 
 











Notes: The t statistics are in brackets. *, **, *** - Significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level 
respectively. The effect in the probability of success from a change in a continuous variable Z, is 
approximated by )]1([/ ii PPdZdP −≅ β .  
 
4.2. Alternative specifications 
 
To test for the robustness of the reported results, we tried several alternative 
approaches of our model. All in all, the results presented in the following show that 
these alternatives seem to give some robustness to the results reported for 
specifications initially chosen. 
 
First we tested an alternative approach for the expenditure dummy variable in (10). 
Instead of checking for the change of public expenditure in relation to the 
improvement of the budget balance, one can be more lenient and take into account the 
cumulative change of both period t and period t-1. For instance, and for the cases 
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dummy, eq. (13) eq. (13) eq. (13) 
 
where a successful consolidation can be found, a variable EXPDUR, as a percentage 

















EXPDUR , (16) 
 
where exp is still the value for total expenditure in year t. 
 
Therefore, specifications (13) and (14) can be estimated as equations (13’) and (14’) 
using the alternative dummy expenditure duration variable. These results are 
presented in the Appendix B. 
 
For the total balance, our results seem to indicate that a more durable expenditure-
based adjustment is more relevant in explaining the success of fiscal consolidations in 
the CE10 countries than in the EU15 countries. Indeed, it can be seen that the 
differential slope for the duration expenditure dummy, δ2, is statistically different 
between the two groups of countries. Since the two regressions have, statistically 
speaking, the same intercept, but different slopes, we may assume that these two 
concurrent regressions do portray different reaction functions for the EU15 and for the 
CE10 countries. In other words, the idea of some persistence of an expenditure-based 
adjustment seemed to be more relevant in explaining the success of fiscal 
consolidations in the CE10 countries than in the EU15 countries. 
 
Additionally, the general specification (13) was also used with a multiplicative 
expenditure dummy instead of an additive dummy, that is, 
 
 )( iiii BEXPBZ ×++= δβα . (17) 
 
However, the estimation results for (17) were rather similar to the ones already 
obtained with the additive expenditure dummy, without any relevant gains in terms of 




Working Paper Series No. 473
April 2005
 
Some sensitivity analysis was performed in order to assess whether changing the 2/3 
threshold for the setting up of the fiscal events, the γ factor in equation (8), and also 
for the attribution of values to the dummy expenditure variable in (10), would 
impinge significantly on the results. Alternative thresholds 1/2 and 3/4 were then 
used, and the results reported respectively in Tables 8 and 9, are rather similar to the 
ones already presented for the initial case with the 2/3 threshold. 
 
Table 8 – Estimation results (using a 1/2 threshold) for total balances,  
EU15 and CE10, 1991-2003  
 
EU15, CE10  
No group  
dummy, eq. (13) 
With group 







α (constant) -1,63 ** 
(-2,25) 






















































McFadden R2  0,14 
 
0,22 0,10 0,51 
Nº of observations 
 
69 69 44 25 
dP/dZ: B 0.12 0.10 
0.08 
0.22 0.07 
 EXP 0.21 0.45 
-0.45 
0.00 0.32 
Notes: The t statistics are in brackets. *, **, *** - Significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level 
respectively. The effect in the probability of success from a change in a continuous variable Z, is 
approximated by )]1([/ ii PPdZdP −≅ β .  
 
Additional control variables such as GDP real growth rate and inflation were used 
under several alternative specifications of the Logit model. However, results were not 
improved. 
 
We also allowed for a longer time lag for assessing the success of a consolidation 
effort, namely using the average of the two years following the fiscal consolidation to 
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evaluate the success, or not, of the effort. In other words, instead of using two 
consecutive years in the determination of the successes in (9), we used three 
consecutive years. Nevertheless, and since the resulting dummy variable is highly 
correlated with the one we already used (correlation is around 0.90), the results were 
broadly unchanged. Moreover, there was even a small decrease in the number of 
successes since in some cases, to apply this longer span, an additional observation 
would be needed.11  
 
Table 9 – Estimation results (using a 3/4 threshold) for total balances,  
EU15 and CE10, 1991-2003  
 
EU15, CE10  
No group  
dummy, eq. (13) 
With group 







α (constant) -2,40 * 
(-1,95) 






















































McFadden R2  0,23 
 
0,32 0,16 0,44 
Nº of observations 
 
47 47 24 23 
dP/dZ: B 0.13 0.11 
0.08 
0.21 0.09 
 EXP 0.34 0.43 
-0.23 
0.23 0.37 
Notes: The t statistics are in brackets. *, **, *** - Significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level 
respectively. The effect in the probability of success from a change in a continuous variable Z, is 
approximated by )]1([/ ii PPdZdP −≅ β .  
 
                                                          
11 Additionally, using the expenditure dummy as the ratio of the change in primary expenditure to 
the change in total balance, the results are broadly in line with those presented in the baseline 
table. Coupling this alternative dummy variable with the successes determined by the average of 
the two years following the fiscal consolidation, the expenditure dummy only turns out as 
significant for the CE10 country group. 
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Finally, instead of using a dummy variable to capture the dimension of the change in 
expenditures vis-à-vis de improvement of the budget balance, we used the change 
itself, namely for the 2/3 threshold for the expenditure dummy variable. Again there 
was no enhancement in the results, which were also in line with the results already 
presented, but now with lower statistical significance. All in all, these alternative 
approaches seem to give some robustness to the results reported for our initially 
chosen specification. 
 
Table 10 summarises the several sets of results for the alternative limits, and one can 
notice that with the 1/2 threshold the expenditure dummy variable also becomes 
significantly different from zero for the group of EU15 countries when the primary 
balance is used.  
 
The evidence regarding expenditure-based adjustments is weak for the EU15 country 
group, also compared to the literature presented above. Here, one has to bear in mind 
that due to the limited available data for the CEE country group, starting only in 1991, 
this implies excluding from the sample a significant number of consolidations that 
occurred in the 1980s and before in the EU15 countries. On the other hand, the limited 


















Working Paper Series No. 473
April 2005
 
Table 10 – Summary of statistical significance findings 
 













Expenditures (revenues) decrease (increase) by at least 2/3 of the improvement in the budget 
balance 
“discretionary change” 
β (B) yes yes no yes yes yes 
Expenditure dummy 
δ (EXP) yes no yes yes* no no 
       
Revenue dummy 
δ (REV) yes no yes no no no 
Expenditures (revenues) decrease (increase) by at least 1/2 of the improvement in the budget 
balance 
“discretionary change” 
β (B) yes yes no yes yes yes 
Expenditure dummy 
δ (EXP) yes no yes no yes no 
       
Revenue dummy 
δ (REV) yes no yes no no no 
Expenditures (revenues) decrease (increase) by at least 3/4 of the improvement in the budget 
balance 
“discretionary change” 
β (B) yes no no yes yes yes 
Expenditure dummy 
δ (EXP) yes no yes yes no no 
       
Revenue dummy 
δ (REV) yes no yes no no no 
 
Note: the full set of results for the revenue dummy with the alternative thresholds of 1/2 and 3/4 are not 
reported in the paper, but are available from the authors on request. 




Many of the CE10 countries will have to undertake fiscal consolidation in the near 
future to reverse the trend of rising debt ratios and comply with the EU fiscal 
framework. Thus the question of how to design fiscal consolidations is of imminent 
interest.  
 
The theoretical and empirical literature shows that basing fiscal consolidation on 
expenditure reduction can have beneficial macroeconomic effects and raise the 








This paper shows that since the early 1990’s expenditure based consolidations have 
indeed tended to be more successful in Central and Eastern Europe. The reverse is 
also true, namely that revenue based consolidations have tended to reduce the 
likelihood of success. The results are robust to alternative thresholds for the 
identification of fiscal events and the composition dummies. Using primary balances 
we find some support for a significant role of the expenditure dummy when 
estimating the effect for the EU15 and the CE10 combined, but not at the 
disaggregated level. 
 
The results differ from those for the EU15 countries, where both composition 
dummies remain generally insignificant. The dominance of expenditure based 
consolidations in Central and Eastern Europe could be explained by an inability to 
increase revenue ratios above already high levels due to a lack of administrative 
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Appendix A – Primary balance results 
 
Table A1 – Fiscal adjustment events and successes (using a 2/3 threshold), primary 
balance, CE10, and EU15, 1991-2003 
 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
                         e s 
Bulgaria     e s                   1 1 
Czech Republic                         0 0 
Estonia           e      e s       2 1 
Hungary     e s e s e s             e s 4 4 
Latvia   e    e s e s e              4 2 
Lithuania           e      e s       2 1 
Poland   e s                     1 1 
Romania   e s       e    e          3 1 
Slovak 
Republic   
e s e s 
            e    e  4 2 
Slovenia                         0 0 
Events 0  4  3  2  2  4  0  1  2  1  0  2  21  
Successes  0  3  3  2  2  0  0  0  2  0  0  1  13 
                           
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
                         e s 
Austria           e        e      2 0 
Belgium     e                    1 0 
Denmark               e          1 0 
Finland     e s     e s e    e s       4 3 
France         e                1 0 
Germany                         0 0 
Greece     e s   e s               2 2 
Ireland         e        e        2 0 
Italy e      e    e              3 0 
Luxembourg           e      e s       2 1 
Netherlands         e                1 0 
Portugal e                    e    2 0 
Spain         e                1 0 




      e s e s e            3 2 
Events 2  0  4  2  7  5  3  1  4  1  1  0  30  
Successes  0  0  3  1  3  2  0  0  2  0  0  0  11 
 


















Table A2 – Events, successes and expenditure composition, primary balance, 
CE10, and EU15, 1991-2003 
 
expenditure dummy threshold: λ=2/3  
Events Success Success rate * Expenditure 
Dummy 
CE10 21 13 62% 12 
EU15 30 11 37% 15 
CE10; EU15 51 24 47% 27 
expenditure dummy threshold: λ=1/2  
Events Success Success rate * Expenditure 
Dummy 
CE10 24 14 58% 15 
EU15 48 12 25% 28 
CE10; EU15 72 26 36% 43 
expenditure dummy threshold: λ=3/4  
Events Success Success rate * Expenditure 
Dummy 
CE10 20 12 60% 11 
EU15 27 11 41% 11 
CE10; EU15 47 23 49% 22 
 
Notes: Exp. Dummy - means that there was a decrease in expenditures of at least 2/3 of the 

























Table A3 – Estimation results (using a 2/3 threshold) for primary balances, 
EU15 and CE10, 1991-2003 
 
EU15, CE10  
No group  
dummy, eq. (13) 
With group 







α (constant) -3,82 *** 
(-3,23) 


















































McFadden R2  0,27 
 
0,28 0,19 0,32 
Nº of observations 
 











Notes: The t statistics are in brackets. *, **, *** - Significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level 
respectively. The effect in the probability of success from a change in a continuous variable Z, is 





























Table A4 – Estimation results (using a 1/2 threshold) for primary balances, 
EU15 and CE10, 1991-2003 
 
EU15, CE10  
No group  
dummy, eq. (13) 
With group 







α (constant) -4,00 *** 
(-4,25) 


















































McFadden R2  0,32 
 
0,36 0,33 0,27 
Nº of observations 
 











Notes: The t statistics are in brackets. *, **, *** - Significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level 
respectively. The effect in the probability of success from a change in a continuous variable Z, is 


























Table A5 – Estimation results (using a 3/4 threshold) for primary balances, 
EU15 and CE10, 1991-2003 
 
EU15, CE10  
No group  
dummy, eq. (13) 
With group 







α (constant) -4,52 *** 
(-3,24) 


















































McFadden R2  0,32 
 
0,38 0,17 0,52 
Nº of observations 
 











Notes: The t statistics are in brackets. *, **, *** - Significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level 
respectively. The effect in the probability of success from a change in a continuous variable Z, is 
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Appendix B – Expenditure duration dummy results 
 
Table B1. Estimation results, expenditure duration dummy (using a 2/3 threshold) for 
total balances, EU15 and CE10, 1991-2003 
 
EU15, CE10  
No group  
dummy, eq. (13’) 
With group 































































McFadden R2 0.11 
 
0.25 0.14 0.35 
Nº of observations 
 











Notes: The t statistics are in brackets. *, **, *** - Significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level 
respectively. The effect in the probability of success from a change in a continuous variable Z, is 




























Table B2. Estimation results, expenditure duration dummy (using a 2/3 threshold) for 
primary balances, EU15 and CE10, 1991-2003 
 
EU15, CE10  
No group  
dummy, eq. (13’) 
With group 







α (constant) -3.52 *** 
(-3.25) 
















































McFadden R2  0.31 
 
0.28 0.17 0,34 
Nº of observations 
 
51 51 30 21 
F Test 0,19 $ 
 











Notes: The t statistics are in brackets. *, **, *** - Significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level 
respectively. $ - At the 5 or 10 per cent level it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the structure is 
equal for the separate regressions for each country group. The effect in the probability of success from a 
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